| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: pegasus: enable basic endpoint checking
pegasus_probe() fills URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:
- usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev, 1) for RX data
- usb_sndbulkpipe(dev, 2) for TX data
- usb_rcvintpipe(dev, 3) for status interrupts
A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.
Add a pegasus_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic
constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and
usb_check_int_endpoints() calls before any resource allocation to
verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched
descriptors at probe time, and avoid triggering assertion.
Similar fix to
- commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking")
- commit 9e7021d2aeae ("net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: CGX: fix bitmap leaks
The RX/TX flow-control bitmaps (rx_fc_pfvf_bmap and tx_fc_pfvf_bmap)
are allocated by cgx_lmac_init() but never freed in cgx_lmac_exit().
Unbinding and rebinding the driver therefore triggers kmemleak:
unreferenced object (size 16):
backtrace:
rvu_alloc_bitmap
cgx_probe
Free both bitmaps during teardown. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix freemap adjustments when adding xattrs to leaf blocks
xfs/592 and xfs/794 both trip this assertion in the leaf block freemap
adjustment code after ~20 minutes of running on my test VMs:
ASSERT(ichdr->firstused >= ichdr->count * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf));
Upon enabling quite a lot more debugging code, I narrowed this down to
fsstress trying to set a local extended attribute with namelen=3 and
valuelen=71. This results in an entry size of 80 bytes.
At the start of xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work, the freemap looks like this:
i 0 base 448 size 0 rhs 448 count 46
i 1 base 388 size 132 rhs 448 count 46
i 2 base 2120 size 4 rhs 448 count 46
firstused = 520
where "rhs" is the first byte past the end of the leaf entry array.
This is inconsistent -- the entries array ends at byte 448, but
freemap[1] says there's free space starting at byte 388!
By the end of the function, the freemap is in worse shape:
i 0 base 456 size 0 rhs 456 count 47
i 1 base 388 size 52 rhs 456 count 47
i 2 base 2120 size 4 rhs 456 count 47
firstused = 440
Important note: 388 is not aligned with the entries array element size
of 8 bytes.
Based on the incorrect freemap, the name area starts at byte 440, which
is below the end of the entries array! That's why the assertion
triggers and the filesystem shuts down.
How did we end up here? First, recall from the previous patch that the
freemap array in an xattr leaf block is not intended to be a
comprehensive map of all free space in the leaf block. In other words,
it's perfectly legal to have a leaf block with:
* 376 bytes in use by the entries array
* freemap[0] has [base = 376, size = 8]
* freemap[1] has [base = 388, size = 1500]
* the space between 376 and 388 is free, but the freemap stopped
tracking that some time ago
If we add one xattr, the entries array grows to 384 bytes, and
freemap[0] becomes [base = 384, size = 0]. So far, so good. But if we
add a second xattr, the entries array grows to 392 bytes, and freemap[0]
gets pushed up to [base = 392, size = 0]. This is bad, because
freemap[1] hasn't been updated, and now the entries array and the free
space claim the same space.
The fix here is to adjust all freemap entries so that none of them
collide with the entries array. Note that this fix relies on commit
2a2b5932db6758 ("xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size underflow") and
the previous patch that resets zero length freemap entries to have
base = 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix interlaced plain identification for encoded extents
Only plain data whose start position and on-disk physical length are
both aligned to the block size should be classified as interlaced
plain extents. Otherwise, it must be treated as shifted plain extents.
This issue was found by syzbot using a crafted compressed image
containing plain extents with unaligned physical lengths, which can
cause OOB read in z_erofs_transform_plain(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: pci: validate release report content before using for RTL8922DE
The commit 957eda596c76
("wifi: rtw89: pci: validate sequence number of TX release report")
does validation on existing chips, which somehow a release report of SKB
becomes malformed. As no clear cause found, add rules ahead for RTL8922DE
to avoid crash if it happens. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpaa2-switch: validate num_ifs to prevent out-of-bounds write
The driver obtains sw_attr.num_ifs from firmware via dpsw_get_attributes()
but never validates it against DPSW_MAX_IF (64). This value controls
iteration in dpaa2_switch_fdb_get_flood_cfg(), which writes port indices
into the fixed-size cfg->if_id[DPSW_MAX_IF] array. When firmware reports
num_ifs >= 64, the loop can write past the array bounds.
Add a bound check for num_ifs in dpaa2_switch_init().
dpaa2_switch_fdb_get_flood_cfg() appends the control interface (port
num_ifs) after all matched ports. When num_ifs == DPSW_MAX_IF and all
ports match the flood filter, the loop fills all 64 slots and the control
interface write overflows by one entry.
The check uses >= because num_ifs == DPSW_MAX_IF is also functionally
broken.
build_if_id_bitmap() silently drops any ID >= 64:
if (id[i] < DPSW_MAX_IF)
bmap[id[i] / 64] |= ... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: do not pass flow_id to set_rps_cpu()
Blamed commit made the assumption that the RPS table for each receive
queue would have the same size, and that it would not change.
Compute flow_id in set_rps_cpu(), do not assume we can use the value
computed by get_rps_cpu(). Otherwise we risk out-of-bound access
and/or crashes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
minix: Add required sanity checking to minix_check_superblock()
The fs/minix implementation of the minix filesystem does not currently
support any other value for s_log_zone_size than 0. This is also the
only value supported in util-linux; see mkfs.minix.c line 511. In
addition, this patch adds some sanity checking for the other minix
superblock fields, and moves the minix_blocks_needed() checks for the
zmap and imap also to minix_check_super_block().
This also closes a related syzbot bug report. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: iris: gen2: Add sanity check for session stop
In iris_kill_session, inst->state is set to IRIS_INST_ERROR and
session_close is executed, which will kfree(inst_hfi_gen2->packet).
If stop_streaming is called afterward, it will cause a crash.
Add a NULL check for inst_hfi_gen2->packet before sendling STOP packet
to firmware to fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: ->d_compare() must not block
... so don't use __getname() there. Switch it (and ntfs_d_hash(), while
we are at it) to kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOWAIT). Yes, ntfs_d_hash()
almost certainly can do with smaller allocations, but let ntfs folks
deal with that - keep the allocation size as-is for now.
Stop abusing names_cachep in ntfs, period - various uses of that thing
in there have nothing to do with pathnames; just use k[mz]alloc() and
be done with that. For now let's keep sizes as-in, but AFAICS none of
the users actually want PATH_MAX. |
| Inappropriate implementation in ServiceWorker in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Out of bounds read and write in GFX in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Inappropriate implementation in Navigation in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Insufficient policy enforcement in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to leak cross-origin data via a crafted Chrome Extension. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| The Appointment Booking Calendar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in versions up to and including 1.6.10.6. This is due to a flawed authorization logic in the nonce_permissions_check() method combined with the public exposure of a site-wide reusable nonce. The plugin exposes a public_nonce value through the /wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner endpoint, which is accessible to unauthenticated users. The appointment deletion endpoint at /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments/{id}/delete and /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments/bulk use a permission check that accepts requests containing both an X-WP-Nonce header (with any arbitrary value) and an X-PUBLIC-Nonce header (with the valid public nonce). When the X-WP-Nonce validation fails, the function falls back to validating the X-PUBLIC-Nonce without properly rejecting the request. Since the public_nonce is exposed to all unauthenticated visitors and is site-wide (not user-specific or appointment-specific), attackers can obtain it and use it to view details of arbitrary appointments, including the public_edit_url, or delete arbitrary appointments by ID. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to view, delete or modify any appointment in the system, disclosing sensitive appointment data, causing service disruption, and loss of booking records. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If
the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual
inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data
buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from
freed memory.
In the syzbot report:
- i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
- Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
- A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
- This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure
inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from
operating on invalid data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: annotate data-races around hdev->req_status
__hci_cmd_sync_sk() sets hdev->req_status under hdev->req_lock:
hdev->req_status = HCI_REQ_PEND;
However, several other functions read or write hdev->req_status without
holding any lock:
- hci_send_cmd_sync() reads req_status in hci_cmd_work (workqueue)
- hci_cmd_sync_complete() reads/writes from HCI event completion
- hci_cmd_sync_cancel() / hci_cmd_sync_cancel_sync() read/write
- hci_abort_conn() reads in connection abort path
Since __hci_cmd_sync_sk() runs on hdev->req_workqueue while
hci_send_cmd_sync() runs on hdev->workqueue, these are different
workqueues that can execute concurrently on different CPUs. The plain
C accesses constitute a data race.
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations on all concurrent accesses
to hdev->req_status to prevent potential compiler optimizations that
could affect correctness (e.g., load fusing in the wait_event
condition or store reordering). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix double free related to rereg_user_mr
If IB_MR_REREG_TRANS is set during rereg_user_mr, the
umem will be released and a new one will be allocated
in irdma_rereg_mr_trans. If any step of irdma_rereg_mr_trans
fails after the new umem is allocated, it releases the umem,
but does not set iwmr->region to NULL. The problem is that
this failure is propagated to the user, who will then call
ibv_dereg_mr (as they should). Then, the dereg_mr path will
see a non-NULL umem and attempt to call ib_umem_release again.
Fix this by setting iwmr->region to NULL after ib_umem_release.
Fixed: 5ac388db27c4 ("RDMA/irdma: Add support to re-register a memory region") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: ensure sb->s_fs_info is always cleaned up
When hfsplus was converted to the new mount api a bug was introduced by
changing the allocation pattern of sb->s_fs_info. If setup_bdev_super()
fails after a new superblock has been allocated by sget_fc(), but before
hfsplus_fill_super() takes ownership of the filesystem-specific s_fs_info
data it was leaked.
Fix this by freeing sb->s_fs_info in hfsplus_kill_super(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/zcrx: fix user_ref race between scrub and refill paths
The io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() function uses a non-atomic
check-then-decrement pattern (atomic_read followed by separate
atomic_dec) to manipulate user_refs. This is serialized against other
callers by rq_lock, but io_zcrx_scrub() modifies the same counter with
atomic_xchg() WITHOUT holding rq_lock.
On SMP systems, the following race exists:
CPU0 (refill, holds rq_lock) CPU1 (scrub, no rq_lock)
put_niov_uref:
atomic_read(uref) - 1
// window opens
atomic_xchg(uref, 0) - 1
return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #1]
// window closes
atomic_dec(uref) - wraps to -1
returns true
return_niov(niov)
return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #2: DOUBLE-FREE]
The same niov is pushed to the freelist twice, causing free_count to
exceed nr_iovs. Subsequent freelist pushes then perform an out-of-bounds
write (a u32 value) past the kvmalloc'd freelist array into the adjacent
slab object.
Fix this by replacing the non-atomic read-then-dec in
io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() with an atomic_try_cmpxchg loop that atomically
tests and decrements user_refs. This makes the operation safe against
concurrent atomic_xchg from scrub without requiring scrub to acquire
rq_lock.
[pavel: removed a warning and a comment] |
